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In this text, Alasdair Cochrane argues for an animal rights
theory intended to “decouple animal rights from animal liberation” (19). By liberation, Cochrane is referring to the belief that
it is wrong to exploit or own animals in any way. This viewpoint
is often accredited to philosopher Tom Regan’s seminal 1983
book, The Case for Animal Rights. Cochrane states that this
belief is central to the animal rights movement and is in contrast to theories of what he and others call “animal welfarism”,
which refers to an interest-based utilitarianism made famous
by Peter Singer’s 1975 book, Animal Liberation. Singer, as opposed to Regan, does not necessitate the liberation of animals
from ownership and exploitation, but emphasizes liberation
from speciesism through equal consideration of the interests of
all sentient beings.
These two philosophies have existed for decades with little
overlap. Cochrane, however, presents an alternative theory that
argues that animals indeed do have rights, but the right to be
liberated is not one of them. This is because he believes that,
“the majority of sentient animals…lack the capacities of autonomous agency” (11). By autonomous agency, Cochrane is
referring to the capability and interest in framing and pursing
long-term life goals. Therefore, he argues that animals are not
necessarily harmed just by being owned or exploited and are
unaware and lacking of any interest, and thus right, to be liberated from ownership and exploitation. As follows, Cochrane
contends that we have a moral obligation to end practices that
result in the suffering and death of animals, but not to liberate
them from ownership and exploitation.
Cochrane’s interest-based rights theory is grounded in the capacity for well-being or the ability to lead a life that can go well
or poorly. This is his criteria as to what makes a being sentient.
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He emphasizes that sentient beings have prima facie rights not
to be harmed or killed. Similar to Singer’s preference-based
utilitarianism, rare exceptions to this rule would arise when
there is an interest to kill or harm an animal that carries more
moral weight than that of the being’s interest not to be killed or
harmed. For example, Cochrane reasons that it is not immoral
for an Eskimo tribe to hunt a whale if the alternative is starving.
However, in most modern societies, where human well-being
can flourish without eating meat, it would not be permissible,
as the whale’s interest in continued life and not experiencing
pain in a hunt exceeds that of the human desire to eat it.
The philosophy that animals do not have a right not to be
owned or exploited creates some interesting deviations from
mainstream animal rights theory. For example, Cochrane maintains that it is not wrong to experiment on sentient begins if
it does not harm or kill the animal. This is in sharp contrast
to animal liberation theories. However, as he points out, experiments that do not harm or kill are rare, thus calling for an
overhaul of the current state of animal research. He also argues
that it is not wrong to use animals in agriculture if it does not
cause them harm or death. Therefore, a transition to veganism
is not necessary as a limited amount of dairy and egg consumption would still be permissible. This, however, is questionable,
as the scale of these industries would have to be so drastically
reduced that it’s hard to imagine in a world of over seven billion inhabitants. Nonetheless, Cochrane cleverly debunks the
criticism that a transition to a more vegetarian or vegan diet
would be devastating to those who make a living off of animal
agriculture. He states:
There is often an economic cost to be paid for respecting the
core interests of individuals, but that cost is rarely decisive in
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deciding the moral issue. For example, there were economic
costs in the abolition of slavery—particularly in the southern
United States—but that did not render abolition the wrong
course of action (85).
Cochrane is unafraid to address some of the stickiest animal
rights dilemmas, such as invasive species and cultural and religious practices that use animals. In Chapter 7 (“Animals and
the Environment”) he maintains that sentient overpopulated
and invasive species, although sometimes problematic, still
have an interest to live, forcing us to acknowledge their rights.
Therefore, overpopulated and invasive species should be addressed by methods other than culling. He criticizes culling as a
very short-term solution that needs to be continuously adopted,
resulting in the infringement of the rights of numerous sentient
beings year after year. With the understanding that contraceptive programs have not been particularly effective to date, he
advocates for further focus and investment on population control methods that are more effective and humane.
One concept that would have been interesting to see Cochrane develop further is sentience. He defines sentience as
being able to experience and feel the world, therefore having
a capacity for well-being. However, animal science has demonstrated that this concept is not always so clear. For example, some animals believed to be non-sentient have displayed
primitive neurological responses that demonstrate an instinct to
avoid harmful stimuli. Does this mean they can feel the world?
Do they have a capacity for well-being? And furthermore, how
will our definitions change as science continues to develop?
Also, the assumption that most sentient beings do not have an
interest in framing and pursing their own goals seems reason-
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able, but could also be a pitfall of our own speciesism. How
would we really know?
Cochrane’s book is a concise read that addresses a wide
range of ethical dilemmas in our current relationships with animals. It provides a broad overview of many of the fiercest debates in the field and serves as a good introduction for someone
new to the concept of animal rights while still being relevant
to those better versed. It is a strong contribution to the animal
rights discussion and challenges us to be open as to what the
realization of animal rights means and should look like.
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